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the Egyptians may still want to preserv		the Egyptians may still want to preserve
the Soviet option. Sadat does not want a role for the USSR in Middle East negotiations at this time, but he probably accepts the fact that ultimately Moscow will be reintroduced into the process in some larger forum. In fact, Sadat and top Foreign	Middle East	option. Sadat does not want a role for the USSR in negotiations at this time, but he probably accepts
the Cairo and Jerusalem talks between Egypt and Israel as pre- caratory to a Geneva conference.	process in	some larger forum. In fact, Sadat and top Foreign ficials have again begun in recent weeks to describe

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By advertising his intentions, which are openly at
odds with government policy, Kahane probably has made it easy
for Begin to head him off and assert the cabinet's authority
on this matter. Kahane's provocative action could trigger Arab
unrest in Hebron and damage Begin's credibility if the govern-
ment fails to take prompt action to restrain the group. There
have been several Arab demonstrations on the West Bank this
month, apparently in reaction to Israeli settlement activity
there.